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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Nuclear arms have become an inescapable
element of
the human condition in the past forty years.

Currently

the United States and the Soviet Union possess
nuclear

bombs enough to annihilate all mankind.

Finding ways to

mitigate the danger of nuclear wars and to secure a less

threatening future
of

is

the most urgent issue in the field

international relations as veil as in United States

security policy making.
The current nuclear peace occurs in a bipolar

system where both of the leading powers, the United
States and the Soviet Union, possess arsenals permitting

each to inflict so much damage on the other even in a

second strike that they have a strong interest in

avoiding war.

This condition of Mutual Assured

Destruction (MAD) has also helped prevent large scale
conventional conflicts between the superpowers since
both fear any such conflict would escalate to nuclear

exchange

.

1

One great danger to the current nuclear balance

would be the emergence of a third nuclear power

possessing enough nuclear capability that each current
superpower has to consider not only the presence of the

1

other but also that of the third when determining
its

security policy.

Judging from present nuclear

capability, overall resources, and foreign policy
goals,
the most likely candidate for the role of third
nuclear

superpower in the future is the People's Republic of
China

2
.

The United States has to be prepared for a

situation in which China strengthens its nuclear power
to the point that it also acquires second strike

capability.
This Master's thesis will examine the following

question: how would China's attainment of Mutual Assured

Destruction capability affect the security of the United
States?

The fields of United States security policy

which will be examined are: deterrence, war fighting,
and arms control.

I

will examine how a change from

bipolarity to tripolarity on the system level would
affect the achievement of the United States

's

nuclear

policy goals, and where necessary, how United States

strategy should be altered to achieve those goals.
Since the actual implication of Chinese second

strike capability depends on China's foreign policy, the

main question will be investigated separately in three
possible scenarios.

The first assumes that China stays

neutral between the current superpowers.

With China

being an independent power, this forms an equilateral

2

.

triangular power system.
S

The second scenario assumes

ino-Amer ican alliance, and the third,

alliance.

In both of these,

a

a

Sino-Soviet

two points of the triangle

lie closer to each other and third is
relatively

isolated
In addition to the above alliance systems
among the

three actors,

I

am aware that there

case: a Soviet-Amer ican alliance.

dropped this scenario.

is

one more possible

However,

This is because,

the present hostility between them,

purposely

I

judging from

it is highly

unlikely that the United States and the Soviet Union
would form an alliance against the third party.

Hence,

all of my scenarios premise continued strong antagonism

between the two nations.
To further simplify the three scenarios

I

assume

that China has a consistent foreign policy toward both

current superpowers, and the United States does not have
to worry about unpredictability of China's action when
it

makes its nuclear policy.
In the conclusion

I

will investigate whether a

tripolar nuclear system would be more stable than a
bipolar nuclear system.

As the following examinations

indicate, the answer to the above question depends

heavily on actor alignments.

3

CHAPTER

SCENARIO

I:

II

NONALIGNED CHINA

This scenario assumes, as other two,
an

international system among the three actors
whose power
is roughly equal.
I
assume that the antagonism between
the United States and the Soviet Union
still exists,

and

China's attitude to both is neutral.

Here, the United

States has to deal with the relation with the
Soviet
Union, but it also has to take account of China;
China

will be a net gainer if the other two fight and
thereby

weaken each other.

A.

A tripolar

Deterrence

system where China stays neutral will

stabilize deterrence between the United States and the
Soviet Union.

Unlike in the bipolar system, one party's

loss is no longer a direct gain for the other.

The

presence of the third independent actor will complicate
the remaining two nations' calculation of gains and

losses.

This greater uncertainty will force them to act

more cautiously.

This,

in turn,

stems from the fact

that all superpowers wish to avoid a situation in which

any one of them would be able to dominate the other two.

4

1.

Basic Deterrence

The basic deterrence for the United
States would be
further stabilized in this tripolar
system.
The

tripolarity would give the Soviet Union
as well as the
United States less incentive to attack
the other.

are two reasons for this.

There

First of all, the realization

of Mutual Assured Destruction between
the United States

and the Soviet Union would be even more
horrifying in
the tripolar system.

Secondly, the potential gain which

each party would acquire by attacking first, even
if it

escapes retaliation, would be less in the tripolarity.
Thus in this tripolar system potential gains and
losses
as a result of action would change in an unfavorable
way
for the aggressor.

I

will examine these reasonings in

more detail in the following paragraphs.

Even now fear that the United States will retaliate
and inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union in

response to

a

first strike deters the Soviet Union from

attacking the United States; after exchanging their
nuclear weapons, both nations will be much worse off
than they are before.

Even if their attack is limited

to destruction of each other's nuclear arsenals,

creating casualties of

a

certain percentage of its

population, they would be certainly weakened.
it might be still

However,

possible for them to remain as the two

5

most powerful nations in the world,

As long as the

nuclear exchange is limited to a certain
degree, they do
not have to worry too much that the
international system
will be dominated by a hegemonic power
afterwards.
After a Sovie t-Amer ican nuclear exchange in
the

tripolar system, however, not only the two would
be

seriously weakened, but also their relative decline
will
be an automatic gain for China.

As long as China stays

neutral and does not allow itself to be involved in the

nuclear fight between the others, it would emerge as a

stronger power over the other two powers after the
fight.

Thus, even limited nuclear exchange in the

tripolar system would have more serious implications
than in the bipolar system: the possibility of becoming

subordinated to the third party.
The second reason

I

assume that the Soviet Union

would be further deterred from aggression in this system
is that this
if

tripolar system brings reduced profit even

Soviet Union succeeds in escaping severe

retaliation.

Credibility of capability and of will to

retaliate are the twin pillars of deterrence.

However,

even if the opponent sees absolutely no credibility in
your retaliatory capability or will,

will immediately attack.

it

does not mean he

Attack also requires a

positive motivation; the opponent must perceive

6

a

gain

that can be acquired only by attacking.

Before deciding

to attack, a state has to make a
political calculation
of "what gains and what losses
would result,

for the

state which is the object of deterrence,
from action on
the one hand, or abstention on the
other ?" 3
Thus even if the Soviet Union should
believe that
the United States will not retaliate in
response

to the

Soviet attack in fear of its counter-retaliation
or that
the Soviet Union can win the fight, the
gain for the

Soviet Union by attacking is considerably less
in the

tripolar system.

In the bipolar system there are only

two principal actors; getting rid of the other

automatically confers dominance on oneself.

On the

other hand even if the Soviet Union manages to wipe out
the United States in this tripolar system, there is no

guarantee that it can automatically dominate the
international system.

Even after extinguishing the

United States there still would be one more actor,
China, which the Soviet Union has to worry about in the

new bipolar system.

Even though China is a neutral

nation toward the United States-Soviet hostilities, it
does not mean that the Soviet Union can coexist with

China in a new bipolar system after getting rid of the

United States from the international system

7

4
.

All of the above conditions
would apply equally to

the United States or China if
either became an

aggressor.

Compared to the bipolar system,
attacking

the homeland of any other superpower
would bring the
same losses from retaliation.
Yet even if retaliation

were weak or not forthcoming,
aggression would bring
less profit in this tripolar system.

As a result mutual

deterrence should be enhanced in this power
system; the
system would provide the potential aggressor
too

little

gain and too much cost, whether he wins or
loses the
game.

Hence, even when it has a chance, the aggressor

would be discouraged from taking the opportunity;
the
rational calculation would conclude that the gain
would
not worth the cost involved and it is better to
coexist

with the enemy than try to attack it.
At first glance,

there seems to be one situation in

which a country might be encouraged to strike first
this system.

in

This involves a limited nuclear exchange.

The Soviet Union might assume that in case of a limited

initial attack, the United States would be more inclined
to accept the damage and agree to negotiate due to the

presence of the third actor.

assumption

is

The rationale behind this

that the United States, having received,

for instance, a Soviet attack limited to 60% of its

land-based missiles, would fear using up

8

a

significant

part of its remaining arsenal to
retaliate the Soviet
Union.
On the one hand the United States
would want to
strike back the Soviet Union.
On the other hand doing
so would leave the United States
quite vulnerable

against China.

Even though China is a neutral nation
it

would be dangerous for the United States
not to have
enough capability to deter it. Thus the
Soviet Union
might conclude that the United States
retaliation
less credible in the tripolar system.

If this

is

is the

case, deterrence will be destabilized.

However, even if the Soviet Union believes in

decreased American credibility,

I

assume that the

decreased potential profit and increased loss by

resorting to aggression would outweigh the likely
benefit from the United States's possible decision to

refrain from retaliation.

Moreover, even in event of

a

limited first strike, the Soviets could not be certain
that the United States would not strike back.

The

United States might calculate that the Soviets would

refrain from counter-retaliation in the same kind of
fear that escalation would leave the Soviet Union

vulnerable to China.
To sum up, by and large it would be less likely in

this tripolar system that the Soviet Union strikes first

compared to in the bipolar system, and it would be

9

easier to achieve deterrence.

The United States should

maintain its present nuclear capability
to deter the
Soviet Union.
It should also make efforts to
avoid

encouraging the Soviet Union to believe that

it will

rather negotiate than retaliate after being
attacked.

2

.

Extended Deterrence
As in the case of basic deterrence, extended

deterrence will be more stable in the tripolar system
for the same reason

I

mentioned above: the potential

gain from attacking is less in the presence of the third

superpower.

In order to consider the case of extended

deterrence against the Soviet nuclear attack, let us
assume that an intensive conflict which involves

conventional weapons takes place in Europe.

At the

height of such a conflict, the Soviet Union would have
to consider the United States's likely response and the

presence of China before it decides whether to launch
nuclear missiles at British and French missile silos.
Two likely scenarios in terms of an American response

would cross the Soviet strategists' minds even in case
of a limited counter-force strike.

First,

nation,

fearing to risk the security of its own

in other words,

fearing counter-retaliation from

the Soviet Union, the United States might decide not to

10

retaliate and agrees to negotiate with the
Soviets.

Alternatively, the United States might decide
to resort
to a retaliation,

inflicting a counter -force second

strike against Warsaw Pact nations.

This would destroy

the Pact's conventional military bases,
and victimize

some civilian populations.
In this tripolar

scenario the Soviets would more

likely refrain from attack, thinking that the United
States would be more inclined to retaliate.

This

is

because the United States would likely think that there
is a

less possibility that their retaliation would be

followed by a Soviet counter-retaliation.

In this

scenario after the United States retaliates against the
initial Soviet aggression, the burden of war escalation

would be on the Soviet side.

The Soviets would have two

choices after the American retaliation.

First is a

counter-retaliation, bombing the remaining NATO bases.
In this case war would very likely escalate to the

extent of counter-value attack or worse, even of nuclear

exchange between the superpowers' homelands.

The second

choice is to refrain from counter-retaliation and

negotiate with the United States out of the fear that
war would escalate to counter-value attack or to

homeland-to-homeland attack.

In this tripolar scenario

the United States would have a good reason to believe

11

that the Soviets would be more reluctant
to escalate war
and refrain from counter-retaliation.
Unlike in a

bipolar system the Soviet Union would
have to take the
presence of China into consideration.
Occupation of
NATO would be meaningless for the Soviet
Union

if

it

becomes so weakened in the process of the
war that China
could easily attack and defeat it.
Moreover, even if the Soviets think that the
United
States would not retaliate, what the Soviet Union
would
gain by attacking Europe is less in the tripolar
system.

With the presence of the third power, the

United States's loss of a part of Europe would not

automatically transfer to the Soviet's gain.

The Soviet

Union would gain power relatively to the United States,
but it would not lead to the situation where the

augmented Soviet Union totally topples the balance of
the international system.

Here, the third actor, China

would play a role of cushion.

Moreover, the Soviets can

foresee the Soviet gain of power will make China uneasy,
and likely cause a conflict between China and itself.
It might even encourage China to ally with the United

States against the Soviet Union.

Thus, there is less

advantage for the Soviet in striking Europe in the
tripolar system.
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Moreover, the horrifying outcome of
the second
scenario would further discourage the
Soviet

aggression.

As examined in the section of
basic

deterrence. Mutual Assured Destruction or
even limited
attack against each other's homeland would
bring a worse
result to the both superpowers in the
tripolar system
than in the bipolar system.
Starting with
Europe, the

two nations bomb each other and end up with
being under
the dominance of China.

Even if the Soviets know that the net gain for

aggression would be less in the tripolar system than in
the bipolar system,

it still might decide to attack

Europe if it can be fairly certain that the United
States will definitely refrain from retaliation.

This

might occur if tripolarity eroded United States will to

retaliate because of worry about China.

Retaliation against an enemy's attack on allies

is

always accompanied by the possibility that the enemy
will then counter-retal iate against the homeland.
the bipolar system, however,

In

it is only the Soviet Union

which the United States has to worry about.

Retaliation

might invite counter-retaliation and inflict damage in
the American homeland, but the only enemy which the

United States is confronting would be also considerably

weakened by the retaliation.

13

In the tripolar system.

.

the United States would have to take
the presence of
China to consideration before it
decides to retaliate.
The retaliation would require the
United States to use
its weapons for the sake of its
allies, and the United

States would have to expose its homeland
and military
force against the Soviet attack in case
of escalation.
This would make the United States quite
vulnerable to
China, which would retain its nuclear forces
intact even

after the United States consumed a substantial
amount of
its force.

Since it would be the United States

's

interest to deter the China's attack against its

homeland even while its allies are in trouble, this
tripolar system might diminish the United States's

resolution to retaliate against the Soviet attack
against its allies, thereby weakening extended
deterrence.

The United States might regard keeping the

nuclear balance among three principal actors in the

system as more important than protecting particular
allies
As mentioned above, however,

I

still believe that

discouragement due to the reduction of likely gain would
outweigh the Soviet's stimulus to attack based on the
increased chance of the United States non-retaliation.

Even if the Soviet Union succeeds in acquiring a part of
Europe, this would not entitle the Soviet Union to gain

14

a relative power significantly on
its hand and become a

hegemonic power.
China.

it would still have to cope with

This decreased gain by attacking is
easily

perceivable in this system.

Next, the United States

might appear less determined to retaliate the
Soviet

aggression in this system, but there would still
be
great uncertainty about whether the United States

a

would

fight back or not.

With this certainly diminished gain

by attacking and still uncertain American response,

it

would be a too much risk for the Soviet Union to
strike
the American ally.
I

have been using NATO nations as examples of an

object of extended deterrence.

The same logic

explaining the enhanced extended deterrence in NATO
would also apply to the case of Japan.

against Japan would be conventional.
is

A Soviet attack

Even if the combat

limited to conventional means, weakening of its force

due to the war with the United States would be risky,

considering the presence of China.

Moreover, the fear

that any conventional war could escalate to nuclear war

which would make the Soviet Union further vulnerable to
China would deter the Soviet aggression against Japan.
Besides, considering the geographical proximity of

Japan to China, it would be even more unlikely that the
Soviet Union resorts to aggression against Japan than

15

against Europe.

Attacking Japan would unavoidably

threaten and hence provoke China.

The Soviet presence

in Japan would be perceived as a
more significant threat

by China than its presence in Europe.

Thus the Soviet

attempt to attack Japan would be more discouraged
by the
presence of China than in the bipolar system.

Credibility of will to retaliate depends on the
nature of the stakes.
In order for the United States
look credible to retaliate,

it

is

to

even more important

than in the bipolar system that the United States

strengthens the tie and coherence with its allies so
that the Soviet Union believes the United States places

great value on Europe and Japan.

3.

3

Crisis Stability
It should be easier to achieve crisis stability in

a tripolar

system of equidistant alignments.

The Soviet

Union has less reason to fear that the United States
will launch a missile in an intensive crisis.

The

Soviet Union would have less gain in attacking first, so
would the United States.

The Soviet Union would be more

firmly convinced that the United States would refrain
from striking first in the tripolar system.
The fear that the other party will strike first is

based on the assumption that the opponent's first strike

16

will destroy much of its own capability
to retaliate.
The Soviet Union would suppose that
the United States
would be further restrained from the first
strike in the

tripolar system, since the incentives to fight
is low in
that system.
The Soviet's assumption would be that
even
if the United States were to strike
first and win
the

fight, this would not make the United States
the

hegemonic power in the international system.

It still

would have to share the ruling role with China
and the
loss of the Soviet Union would most likely cause
a

severe conflict with China.
Thus the tripolar system gives a greater crisis

stability effect among the actors than the bipolar
system.

However, there would be one potential threat to

crisis stability inherent in this system: a catalytic
war.

Since any war between the current superpowers

would be China's gain, China might be attempted to

attack either state, disguising it is an attack by the
other current superpower in hopes of leading the two

states to fight each other until both suffered

considerable damage.

Such a concern was actually

expressed seriously in the current bipolar system by the
Soviet leaders.®

Conditions where the superpowers might be dragged
into a nuclear war by the third party are identified by

Henry S. Rowen.

These conditions are:

17

1.

The third party has nuclear weapons
and a

delivery capability;
2.

The third party has a motive or
causes;

3.

The superpowers'

forces,

and

intelligence, and

mindsets are susceptible to being triggered
by
such an attack.

7

In the tripolar system the first condition
is fully

met, and nonaligned China in this tripolar
system is

more likely to meet the second condition.

If the other

two superpowers became involved in a nuclear war
by one
va y or another , both nations would be definitely
worse

off than before.

The relative gain of power accruing to

China might be sufficient to make it the dominant power,

without engaging in any war with either the Soviet Union
or the United States.

Rowen further identifies special

conditions to catalyze a war after the United States or
the Soviet Union were attacked:
1.

high political tension between the United States

and the USSR;
2.

forces on high alert status;

3.

intelligence and warning systems unable to

discriminate between attack by another superpower
and attack by the third party;
4.

at least one of the "target" superpowers has a

"hair-trigger" nuclear launch policy.®

18

To discourage a catalytic attack
from China and also
to avoid being dragged into such
a tragic and unnecessary

fight, two steps would have to be taken
by both the
United States and the Soviet Union.
First, it would be

necessary to increase their intelligence
performance so
that they could accurately identify the
source of

attack

even in the height of tension.

Although it would be very

difficult against sea-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs), the Soviet Union and the United States
should

make efforts against land-based intercontinental

ballistic missiles (ICBHs).

The known ability of both

states to identify where a land-based attack came from

would discourage China's ambition to make the other two
start fighting.

Second, both nations would need to

exercise careful control over launching weapons.

This

involves, first, avoiding a general launch-on-warning

policy.

It also involves imposing controls to ensure

that missiles are launched only when authorized.

B.

War Fighting

The United States would probably find this tripolar

system more favorable for achieving its war fighting

policy goals than a bipolar system.
a third actor

As long as there is

in the system who can very likely become

the dominant military power in the international system

19

after the other two fight, the United
States and the
Soviet Union would be encouraged to act
very prudently
even after an initial battle takes place.
Their common
interest in avoiding the consequence of China
emerging
as a hegemon able to dominate the other
two would impose

some moderation even in warfare.
In the bipolar system "(Flirst and foremost,

Soviet leadership fears defeat

damage

"

.

*

,

the

not the suffering of

This tendency would likely be modified

in this tripolar system;

even if it avoids defeat, the

Soviet Union would have to fear the suffering of

extensive damage in the tripolarity system, since it
would want to maintain the capability to function as a

nation to deal with China after the war.

This shift of

the Soviet emphasis would in turn make the achievement
of the United States war-fighting goals easier;

two parties to limit the intensity of war.

it takes

Both the

United States and the Soviet Union would want to limit
the scale of war so that they could still remain as

principal actors in the system after war.
Since direct resort to nuclear war is unlikely,
this section assumes that an American-Soviet nuclear war

starts in a limited way as a result of escalation from
the conventional warfare.

20

1.

War Winning
In the tripolar system the war-winning
goal and

methods to achieve it would be preserved
in pretty much
the same way as in the bipolar system.
However, its

relative priority would likely be ranked
among other
goals in a different way.
Damage limitation,
war

termination, and escalation control would gain in

relative importance compared to war winning.

War

winning would not be useful unless the winner retained

sufficient capability to cope with China after the war.
While the United States is engaged in war with the

Soviet Union, it would always have to keep it in its
mind that China would be there intact.

2.

War Termination

Early war termination would be even more important
in the tripolar system than in the bipolar system.

A

different expectation would exist for war termination in
the tripolar system, however, compared to in the bipolar

system.

In the bipolar system what the both nations

wish is to terminate war at least before catastrophic
holocaust.

In the tripolar system they would have to

terminate war at a much earlier stage, before China
becomes able to dominate the two nations damaged by
nuclear exchange.

21

In the bipolar system even if the
United States

emerges with its military capability severely
reduced
and its economic, industrial sectors
seriously damaged
after the war, it does not have to worry
too much about
another power attempting to take advantage
of the

situation.

In the tripolar system, however, the
United

States would have to consider the possible
aggression by
the third power, China.

After terminating war with the

Soviet Union, the United States would still have to
be

powerful enough to deter China's attack.

following

In the

will examine how the United States strategy

I

should be altered to achieve its war-fighting policy
goals in the tripolar system.
War termination requires mutual agreement at least
to a cease-fire, which,

in turn,

means that two nations

have to be able to communicate with each other.

Invulnerable, reliable communication systems between the

United States and the Soviet Union are an essential

prerequisite for war termination.

At present two

nations are depending on the "hot line" to communicate

between White House and Kremlin which

vulnerable to nuclear attack.

is

quite

This fragile

communication system which would be destroyed even by a
limited attack on each capital is criticized even in the

status quo

3.

0

In the tripolar system where the United
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States and the Soviet Union have a
greater incentive to
negotiate after nuclear war breaks out,
it
is

indispensable for the United States with
a joint effort
with the Soviet Union to build survivable
and effective
communication links.
Secondly, there should be a considerable
shift in
the United States targeting on the Soviet
Union.

in the

current plans the Soviet Union's C 3 I facilities
are
listed as a relatively early target 11 in an

expectation that less retaliation would occur

if Soviet

command and communications systems were disrupted.

The

assumptions behind this are that once nuclear war
starts, disrupting the Soviet command system at least
has a possibility to limit damage on the United States,

since it will cause enough chaos in the political and

military sectors to deny political leaders control of
their forces and thus decrease scale of its attack 12
.

Even in a bipolar system this assumption can be

Questioned.
dangerous.

In a tripolar system it becomes even more

Therefore, the current strategy to include

its C 3 I network as an early target has to be

modified.

The United States would have greater need to

negotiate with the Soviet Union during war in this
tripolar system, and its attack on the Soviet

communication systems would eliminate the chance for the
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political leaders to negotiate with the
opponents.
Moreover, disruption of the communication
systems would
make it impossible for the Soviet
leaders to issue
orders to their armed forces to halt
attacks even when
they decide to do so.
Negotiation to end war would be
meaningless unless the order to cease fire can

be sent,

received, and followed.

Similarly, the United States should not adopt

"decapitation" strategies making the Soviet leadership
target.

a

It requires political leaders in the Soviet

Union to negotiate and terminate war.

Moreover,

destroying the Soviet leadership would put the United
States in a great risk, by transferring the control of

Soviet war fighting from the political leaders to

military commanders.

At least some of them would

likely launch attacks, negating any prospect of war

termination
By the same token it would be the United States's

strong interest to make its own 0*1 network more
secure against a possible Soviet attack so that its own

political leaders could stay in charge of its command.
It takes two parties to communicate; the United States 's

exempting the Soviet C 3 I system from attack would be
meaningless unless the United States could secure its
own system.

This aspect is particularly worrisome when
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one thinks of the current Soviet nuclear
targeting

doctrine; the Soviet strategy is to resort to
a rapid
and massive attack on the United States C 3 I
system to
limit damage once nuclear war breaks out. 13

Currently the United States lags behind the Soviet
Union in terms of the C 3 survivability and protection
of the political and military leadership:

Since the 1950s, the Soviet Union has placed great
emphasis on ensuring the survivability during a
nuclear exchange of the Soviet leadership....
Shelters have been constructed for about 110,000
members of the leadership, made up of some 5,000
party and government officials at the national and
republic level; 63,000 party and government leaders
at krai , oblast city, and urban ra ion level;
2.000 managers of key installations; and about
40.000 members of civil defense staffs.
.

Moreover, C 3 I systems are much more dispersed and

redundant in the Soviet Union.

The United States does

not possess this kind of extensive protection measures

against its own C 3 I system.

In the tripolar system

the increased importance of war-termination goal would

require the United States to improve the current

vulnerable C 3 I systems and measures to protect
political leaders at least to the extent of the Soviet
Union's so that the United States could leave a

possibility to negotiate and terminate war.
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3.

Escalation Control
Escalation control involves influencing the

intensity of war.
ability.

Hence it refers to two kinds of

One is ability to choose an appropriate time

and rate to escalate war when intensification would

yield advantages.

The other is ability to prevent war

from intensifying when further intensification of war

disadvantageous.

is

The intention behind seeking this

latter ability is to "deter escalation and coerce the

enemy into negotiating

a

war termination acceptable to

the United States by maintaining our capability to

effectively withhold attacks from additional hostage
targets highly valued tor] vital to enemy
leaders ...

,,xs

Since the United States would wish more

strongly to limit damage in this scenario to be able to
deal with China afterwards, it would have an increased

interest in enhancing this ability of escalation

control
In order to emerge as a powerful enough nation to

balance China after a nuclear exchange with the Soviet
Union, the United States would have a stronger interest
in the goal of escalation control,

intensification.

prevention of war

That the Soviet Union would have

a

similar interest in limiting damage to itself would make
the attainment of this goal easier for the United
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States.

Combining other war-fighting goals,
the United
States's interest would be to prevent
escalation

of war

and to terminate nuclear war as soon
as possible, which
would lead to keep the damage by war
at minimum.
To achieve this goal the United
States should take

two methods.

First, to sustain the sophisticated,
yet

currently vulnerable C 3 I system in the course
of any
nuclear exchange. This is vital to controlling
escalation, because the C 3 I system is the eyes and
ears for any leadership when it has to execute
nuclear

attack.

Without this function nuclear attack would be

that by the blind and deaf, thereby controlling

escalation would be impossible.

The C 3 I system would

provide the leadership with the ability to control

action so that responses would not escalate war
unnecessarily; in terms of the timing and pace of attack
before it decides to resort to attack; in terms of the
kind of attack and target so that the Soviet Union could

assess the United States's intentions of the particular
nuclear response.

1*

Thus C 3 I system is

indispensable for escalation control.

Necessity to

improve its current vulnerability which was mentioned in
the section of war termination should be once again

emphasized here for the achievement of escalation
control
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Secondly, effective escalation control
requires the
United States to broaden the range of
options
in its

flexible nuclear response strategy so
that it can
respond to any level of Soviet attack in
an appropriate
way.

in other words,

if the

Soviet attack is

conventional, the United States should answer the
attack
by conventional weapons.
If the Soviet attack
is

limited to 10 megaton equivalent warhead against
five

United States silos, the United States retaliation

should be also limited in the equal way.

The counter-

attack in this case should not be as massive as, for
example, 100 megaton attack against 50 Soviet silos,

because this would quickly escalate the warfare.

Thus

the United States should not punish the Soviet

aggression more than necessary, but should do in a
selective and deliberate fashion.

Caution would be even

more necessary when the United States decided to

retaliate in the tripolar system.

The necessary

instruments for this purpose are small-scale, accurate,

counter-force nuclear weapons.
However, this method to make nuclear force more

accurate and effective for counter-force strategies has
one disadvantage.

Acquisition of a great number of such

weapons would seem to the Soviets that the United States
is

trying to gain first-strike capability.

28

Achievement

of escalation control by deployment
of these weapons

would have to be traded off to some
extent with a
consideration of crisis stability achievement.

4.

Damage Limitation
The United States would also have an
increased

interest in damage limitation in the tripolar
system;

it

has to remain powerful enough to face China after
it

engages in war with the Soviet Union.

In order to stay

powerful enough to deter China, it is necessary for the
United States to minimize the damage of war.

For this,

on top of early termination of war and escalation

control, both strategic and civil defense should be

strengthened.

Protecting the civilian sectors which

would be vital for the nation's recovery after war would
be very important.

Particularly with respect to measures of passive
defense, the United States has been relatively

indifferent compared to the Soviet Union.

As Raymond

Aron notes:

The fear of escalation in the national defense
budgets, without altering the balance of terror,
affords one partially rational explanation of the
indifference manifested toward measures of passive
defense which would be relatively cheap and
effective (light shelters against radioactive
fallout, stockpiling of the machines and materials
most indispensable to reconstruction, evacuation
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plans for cities, education of the
population,

w tC

•

/

•

The fact that the entire population
cannot be evacuated
does not mean a nation can neglect civil
defense

altogether.

With civil defense, nations increase the

chance of survival and decrease the damage to
some

extent if nuclear war breaks out.

The Soviet Union,

partly due to its history of frequent foreign
invasions,
is quite avare of this,

and has been engaged in

improving its civil defense programs.

An example of

their extensive plan to evacuate leadership in case of
war has been already cited in the section of war

termination.
To limit damage and recover as a functional nation
the United States should improve the currently

insufficient civil defense measures.

A program of

evacuating urban population in case of crisis, for
example, should be seriously considered.

Besides, by

ensuring that the United States could decrease some
human and material loss through civil defense, it could

enhance deterrence, since it will make the United

States's resolution to retaliate more credible. xe

C.

Arms Control

In the tripolar scenario of a neutral China arms

control is extremely important, but more difficult than
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in the bipolar system.

Arms control negotiations are

hard even only between the Soviet Union
and the United
States; adding one more actor who might
have a

significantly different nuclear doctrine from
either of
the original superpowers would certainly
make
arms

control much tougher.

China would likely continue to

follow its current nuclear doctrine.

At present the

United States tries to deter nuclear attack by
Mutual

Assured Destruction; the Soviet Union tries to achieve

deterrence by enhancing war-fighting capability; China
bases deterrence on improving its capability to sustain
the damage and to recover after nuclear war.

1®

This particular tripolar system would supply the

least optimum condition for successful arms control.

In

the other two tripolar scenarios China would cooperate

with its ally, standing on the side of its partner in
arms control negotiations to increase alliance
security.

In this particular scenario, however, China

would act totally independently of, and differently from
both of other two.
Once nonallied China acquires its second strike

capability (even before that), the United States and the
Soviet Union should try to include China to arms control
talks.

Whether they want reduction, freeze or change in
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their force structure, trilateral
agreement is necessary
for the security in the tripolar
system.

Chinese attainment of second strike
capability
would also complicate arms control
by forcing changes in
existing arsenals. The United States's
currently well

balanced force structure among ICBMs, SLBMs
would be maintained in the tripolar system.

,

and bombers

With a

presence of China, however, it would have to
increase
the number of long-range missiles,
particularly that of

SLBMs to maintain second strike capability
against both
other superpowers.
The Soviet Union would have to increase the
number
of ICBMs targeted on the western part of China,
and also

acquire some medium-range missiles along the border with
China to deter its attack.

Like the United States the

current force balance would likely to be maintained;

strong emphasis on land-based missiles and less on SLBMs
due to lack of sufficient ports.
The Chinese force would look like something between

those of the United States and the Soviet Union.

In

terms of its balance among land-based missiles, SLBMs,

and bombers, Chinese nuclear arsenals would be closer to
that of the United States than the Soviet Union; owing
to its relatively long coast and possession of ice-free

ports,

it would emphasize submarines
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forces more than

the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, since it has
to

deter the Soviet Union as veil as
United States, it
would need to retain more mediumand short-range
missiles than the United States. At
present China does
not have much interest in deploying
a large number of
bombers, therefore it is doubtful if it
would increase
the number of bombers in this tripolar
system. 20

1.

Deterrence
In this scenario the United States would want
to

establish mutual deterrence with the Soviet Union and
with China.

The United States knows that China would

stay as neutral in case of war with the Soviet Union.
As long as nonallied China has a large nuclear arsenal,

however,

it would be the Unites States 's goal to have

enough nuclear capability to deter China.

For this the

United States should make no agreements inhibiting its

ability to strengthen its second strike capability and

modify its force structure to deal with China.
If China stays as a neutral nuclear power,

the

United States could utilize the current nuclear

capability to deter China only.

However,

it would be

the United States's interest to prepare for the very

worst scenario in this system; deterrence against China
fails, and the Soviet Union also decides to strike the
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United States.

Against this case, the United States

would want to deploy weapons to develop
its double
second strike capability. First the
United States would
want to have enough weapons to have
second strike

capability to deter a Soviet's attack.

Second,

it

would

want to have enough capability to inflict
unacceptable
damage on China even after it launches its
second strike
to the Soviet Union.

This would also be in the Soviet's

strategy; strikes back against a China's attack
and
still be able to deter the United States's first

strike.

To ensure their double second strike capabilities

they would want to change the balance of their force
structure to emphasize bombers or SLBMs, or by making
land-based ICBMs more invulnerable against a first
strike.

In this case the Soviet Union's current force

structure which more emphasizes the relatively

vulnerable land-based missiles 21 would be altered so
that it could strengthen its second strike capabilities.
It has been estimated that unacceptable damage for

both the United States and the Soviet Union is 400

megaton equivalent weapons which would destroy 20 to 25
percent of the population and 50 to 67 percent of
industrial capacity. 22

It would take the same amount

of weaponry to inflict unacceptable damage on the

Chinese industry.

However, both the United States and
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the Soviet Union would need probably
somewhat more

weapons to inflict unacceptable human
loss on China,
judging from its population which is
not only four to
five times of that of either the
United States or the
Soviet Union but also more dispersed.

To keep the

credible deterrence capability against the
worst case,
the United States would have to make sure
to maintain

at

least around 1,000 or more megaton equivalent

retaliatory power (400 for the Soviet Union, the
rest
for China)

2.

in the arms negotiation table.

Crisis Stability
The United States should support measures that

improve secure communication networks within and between
the nations.

Plans to supplement the hot line and

establish a crisis center to identify and give
information about a developing crisis should be

vigorously pursued. 23

These measures are important in

the bipolar system, but they would be even more

important in this tripolar system.

The United States

could also try to make an agreement with the Soviet

Union not to target each other's C 3 I systems.
The above measures should also be extended to

include China; the trilateral C 3 I and Washington-

Moscow-Bei jing "hot line" agreement would be one of the

35

few shared Interests of the three
participants at the
arms negotiation table.
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CHAPTER III

SCENARIO II: SINO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE

This scenario assumes a tripoiar system where
the

United States and China form an alliance against
the
Soviet Union.

The United States-Ch inese alliance is

based on a mutual security treaty under which the
two

nations act jointly against the Soviet Union in case of

conflict in the international system.

Since the United

States and China together would have an overwhelmingly

favorable nuclear balance against the Soviet Union, this

scenario has some resemblance with the era of clear
United States nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union

between 1945 and 1957.

A.

Deterrence

This particular version of the tripoiar system has

mixed effects on deterrence.

Unless the Soviet Union

possesses a nuclear arsenal capable of second strike

against both the United States and China simultaneously,
the Sino-Amer ican alliance will be too formidable a

power for Soviet Union to challenge.

Therefore, it

would be much easier for the United States to deter the
Soviet aggression.

On the other hand, deterrence would

be considerably jeopardized from the Soviets'
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point of

view; the Sino American alliance might regard
its

advantage as allowing a first strike.
Judging from the current economic performance of
the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries,

highly unlikely that they could build up such
arsenal to keep up with the

S

it

is

a large

ino-Amer ican alliance.

At

present it is estimated that the Soviet Union allocates
as much as 17 percent of its gross national product to

defense, while the United States allocates

6

percent.

This expenditure is placing a heavy burden on the

nation's economy.

2-4

As long as the Soviet economy

grows slowly, there will be serious constraints on its

ability to increase the size of its nuclear arsenal.
Even so, the Soviet situation is not hopeless.

The

United States and China would be unlikely to attack the
Soviet Union even in this scenario.

Even in the case of

successful United States and Chinese joint first attack

against the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union would most
likely still possess enough nuclear power to inflict

unacceptable damage on both the United States and China.
It has been estimated that what would be considered

unacceptable damage for the United States

is

20 to 25

percent of population loss and 50 to 65 percent of

industry destruction, which would be easily met with the
nuclear destructive power of 400 megaton equivalent. 23
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It

is

difficult to determine what would be

unacceptable damage for China, and how many
weapons
would be necessary to inflict it by the
time China
acquires second strike capability. Even today

estimating what China would regard as unacceptable
damage is a much-debated question.

2*

How its economy

develop, and how industry and population spread
over the

territory would affect both the definition of
unacceptable damage and the number and size of warheads
required to achieve it.

I

would roughly estimate,

however, that China, like the United States, would

regard loss of 50 to 65 percent of its industrial base
as unacceptable.
it

This will definitely be the case after

evolves into an advanced industrial nation which

depends largely on various sectors of its industry such
as electric power generating capacity, petroleum

refining, or iron and steel works.
Secondly, China's unacceptable population loss

would be somewhat more than that of the United States.

China's population is more than one billion compared to
240 million of the United States 27

.

A 20 to 25

percent population loss for the United States
60 million deaths.

is

48 to

The same number of deaths would be a

far lower portion of China's population.

Even a

comparable percentage loss, that is, 200 to 250 million,
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would not have the same social impact.

Moreover,

judging from the way this population
is spread, it would
take more weapons to cause the
same number or the same

percentage of casualties in China as in the
United
States or the Soviet Union.
Its ratio of city

population in the entire population

is

less than 10

percent compared to United States in the 20 to
30
percent range and the Soviet Union in 30 to
40 percent
range.

2*

Because of these differences

it would be

I

conclude that

necessary for the Soviet Union to possess

about 600 to 800 megaton equivalent of weapons to impose

unacceptable damage on China after receiving the first
strike.
is

At present the average yield of Soviet warheads

0.8 megaton and one launcher carries four warheads in

average (4.5 for ICBMs, 3.6 for SLBMs, and 7.6 for
bombers.)

2*

I f

we assume that the Soviet Union

continues to have this kind of structure in the tripolar
system,

it would need 750 to 1,000 warheads and 185 to

250 launchers to yield 600 to 800 megaton equivalents of

destructive power.
It would be entirely possible for the Soviet Union

to have enough nuclear weapons to launch such an

unacceptable second strike against both nations after
absorbs the first strike.

At present the Soviet Union

has about 8,000 megaton equivalent weapons in total in
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about 11,000 warheads and 2,500 launchers. 30

In this

scenario the Soviet Union night increase it a
little,
but would never decrease it.

Let us suppose the

optimistic case, that the Soviet Union only maintains
the status quo capability.

Even in case of a United

States and China joint counter-force attack against
the
Soviet Union, it is impossible for them to destroy
all
the Soviet nuclear forces.

Assume an extremely

optimistic case; the United States and China succeed in

destroying 80 percent of land-based ICBMs, 70 percent of
SLBMs, and 80 percent of bombers.

With the remaining 20

percent of ICBMs (230 launchers and 1,300 warheads), 30

percent of SLBMs (280 launchers and 1,000 warheads), and
20 percent of bombers

(30 bombers and 250 warheads),

the

Soviet Union would still possess about 2,000 megaton

equivalent weapons. 31

This destructive power would be

enough to inflict unacceptable retaliation to both the
United State and China which require 1,200 megaton

equivalent weapons in total at most.
Hence

I

suppose that the United States and China

would still prefer to coexist with the Soviet Union
rather than to attack it in this tripolar system; they

would consider it still too costly to engage in a
nuclear fight with the Soviet Union, sacrificing their
own populations and industrial capability.
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As long as

.

there exists a possibility that conventional
war

escalates to nuclear war, the

S ino-Aroer

lean ally would

be also deterred from conventional
attack on the Soviet

Union

1.

Basic Deterrence
In this tripolar system it would be easier
for the

United States to deter a Soviet attack on its homeland.
In case of either an all-out attack on the
American

homeland or a limited attack on the United States

strategic bases, the United states would have a credible

capability and will to retaliate against the Soviet
aggression.

In this tripolar system the credibility of

the United States's will to retaliate would be further

strengthened by its alliance with China.

Moreover, the

Soviet Union would have to fight a two-front war once it

starts nuclear attack.

As long as the Soviet Union

stays as a rational actor, it would be convinced that it

could not escape from unacceptable damage by the

alliance's second strike.
It would be a wishful calculation for the United

States to think that, splitting the potential damage

with China, it would receive only half of the the damage
it

would receive in the bipolar system.

But the United

States could rationally assume that the damage would be
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less severe than in the bipolar system.

Thus, expecting

less damage from the Soviet Union, the
United States's

will to retaliate would be strengthened in this

scenario.

This also would be the likely Soviets'

perception; the United States's will to retaliate
would

appear more credible in this power system.
Secondly, there would be no question about the

credibility of United States capability to retaliate due
to its alliance with China.

With the effect of

increased credibility of the United States's will and

capability, the Soviet Union would be further

discouraged from attacking.

Hence,

in this tripolar

system it would be easier for the United States to deter
the Soviet attack

Finally,

in this scenario,

the Soviet Union would

have to think about a possibility of fighting against

China most seriously when it starts nuclear attack.
When China becomes an ally of the United States, the

agreement would be likely to be that when one party is
attacked, the other will join the battle and support the

ally at some point.

With such an agreement, there would

be no chance for the Soviet Union to emerge as an winner
of the fight after
if

it strikes the United States.

Even

the Soviet Union should have a chance to wipe out the

United States by its attack, it would still have to
fight against China afterwards.
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Even in the status quo, the Soviet Union
fears
nuclear exchange with China although China
is much a
weaker nation in terms of its military
capability.

According to an analysis by Banning N. Garrett
and
Bonnie S. Glaser:

The Soviets perceive China, despite its inferiority
in military hardware, as having advantage
in
survivability and protracted war capability
The
Chinese are aware of the Soviets' fear that
surviving Chinese population and military forces
after a nuclear war would pose a threat to a

crippled Soviet Union 32
.

In the current bipolar system China is capable of

deterring the Soviet nuclear attack from an inferior
position.

In the tripolar system the Soviets'

fear of

China would be even stronger due to its increased
nuclear arsenal.

Hence with the fear of fighting a

nuclear war with China, the Soviets' attack against the

United States would be further deterred in the
S

ino-Amer ican alliance scenario.
It

is

hard to imagine in this scenario that the

Soviet Union, being in an inferior position, would be

tempted to attack the United States or China (apart from
a

desperate pre-emptive strike).

However, suppose the

Soviet Union thinks about destroying the United States
ICBMs in an extreme crisis situation.

44

The Soviet

's

strategists would assume the United States would
be more
encouraged to retaliate with its remaining mobile
missiles and SLBMs than in the bipolar system, out
of

assurance that China would join the combat or at
least
that China would not take advantage of new United
States

weakness

.

Just as it would be impossible for the

Sino-Amer ican alliance to destroy all the Soviet forces
in one blow,

it would be also

impossible for the Soviet

Union to destroy all the American forces by its first
strike.

Currently even

a

Soviet first strike that

destroys 70 percent of ICBMs, 40 to 50 percent of SLBMs,
and 70 percent of nonalert bombers, does not deprive the

United States of its ability to inflict unacceptable
damage on the Soviet Union; at most 400 megaton

equivalent weapons, or probably less than that, to cause
20 to 25 percent population loss and 50 to 67 percent

industrial capacity damage. 33

This fact would remain

the same in this tripolar system.
In any case the United States's retaliation would

impose major damage on the Soviet forces.

China might

aid the United States's action and strike the Soviet

Union immediately after the first strike from the Soviet
Union.

Even if China did not start attacking the Soviet

Union at this point, for fear of Soviet counter-
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retaliation, China would certainly join the
United
States and attack the Soviet Union.

if war broke out,

the Soviet Union would sooner or later have to
cope with

two nations at the same time.

This would yield a dreadful consequence for the

Soviet Union; even after it uses up its counter-force

weapons the alliance would still possess considerable
number of counter-force arsenals.
end here and further escalates,

In case war does not

it would bring a

catastrophic damage to the Soviet Union.

Even though

the United States and China would receive severe damage,

losing a significant portion of their populations, they

would still be able to recover from the damage and

eventually start functioning as

a

nation.

The Soviet

Union, however, would be completely shattered, and would

most likely cease to exist as a functional nation.

Even if the Soviet Union decides to attack both the

United States and China at the same time, chances are
would receive more serious damage than in
system.

a

it

bipolar

It would be clear to the Soviets that they

cannot destroy all the opposing forces but would leave
the United States and China with enough second strike

capability independently; they would certainly resort to
retaliation against the Soviet Union.

With its nuclear

capacity, the Soviet Union is unable to give the same
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degree of damage as what it received
to both the United
States and China.
in either case, unlike in the
bipolar
system, there is not even a slim chance
for the Soviet
Union to emerge as a winner in the tripolar
system where
the United States and China make an
alliance.
As long

as the Soviet Union remains as a rational
actor, their

calculation would never tempt them to break the
deterrence

2

.

Extended Deterrence
It would be easier for the United States to achieve

extended deterrence against both Soviet nuclear and

conventional attack in this tripolar system.

When the

United States forms an alliance with China, it would
increase the United States's credibility of capability
and will to retaliate in case Europe or Japan is

attacked.

In case of Soviet nuclear attack, the United

States together with China could bring an unacceptable

damage on the Soviet Union.
attack, the

S

In case of its conventional

ino-Amer ican alliance would most likely

emerge as victors against the Soviet Union.
following, first,

I

In the

examine the implication of the

Sino-Amer ican alliance to extended nuclear deterrence,
next, to extended conventional deterrence.
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To consider the system's implication
to extended
nuclear deterrence, let us assume a
conflict in Europe.
Before the Soviets launch an attack
on American,

British, or French missiles as the
conventional fight
between the NATO and Warsaw Pact intensifies
in Europe,
they have to consider what would happen
next.
in this

situation, the United States's choice would be
either:
1.

to retaliate by attacking Soviet counter-force

weapons or selected military targets of the Warsaw
Pact,
the Soviet Union, or both in a restrained manner,
or

2.

to accept the Soviet aggression in Europe and
agree to

negotiate
In this tripolar system the Soviet Union would have

more reasons to believe the United States would choose
the first choice.

First, there would be no question

about the United States's ability to retaliate.
its full nuclear capability intact at home.
it

It has

Moreover,

could also rely on the Chinese arsenal, if

necessary.

Secondly, the United States

's

will to

retaliate would appear more credible than in the bipolar
system, since the alliance has the ultimate advantage
once war escalates.
The likely Soviet response against the American

retaliation would also encourage the United States to
punish the Soviet Union.

Suppose the United States
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retaliates against the original Soviet aggression,

attacking the Warsaw Pact in a limited way.

Two

possible Soviet responses to the United States

's

retaliation are: to accept the damage in Eastern
Europe
and negotiate due to its fear of escalation, or
to

counter -re ta 1 iate with a full knowledge that it
would
lead to a further escalated nuclear fight, probably
a

full-scale nuclear war.

In the S ino-Amer ican alliance

scenario, the Soviet Union would more likely choose the
first option, since there would be nothing for them to

gain by escalating war.

This would in turn encourage

the United States to retaliate against the initial

Soviet attack.
The reason why the Soviet Union would be more

likely to negotiate after receiving the American

retaliation in this scenario is that it would fear the
escalation of warfare.

In the bipolar system the Soviet

Union might believe in its relative victory after
nuclear exchange even if it would be terribly damaged.
In this tripolar system the Soviet Union would not

indulge in such an optimism.

By the time the fight

involves homeland to homeland nuclear exchange between
the United States and the Soviet Union, China would

certainly join the fight, supporting the United States.
Even in the status quo the Soviet Union fears China's
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capability in protracted war and recovery
after nuclear
war, and its possibility to emerge
as an eventual victor
as cited in the former tripolar
scenario. China would
be an even more formidable foe for
the Soviets if they

have to face it after being crippled
by the fight with
the United States.
All these considerations mean that

extended nuclear deterrence would be easier for
the
United States in this diplomatic configuration
of

the

tripolar system.
The implications of the

S

ino-Amer ican alliance for

extended conventional deterrence would be also more
favorable than those of the bipolar system.

The Soviet

Union would be further deterred from conventional attack

against American allies in this scenario.
First,

it

is

considered that escalation of

conventional war is the one of the most likely paths to
nuclear war 34
.

Since the Soviets would be so afraid

of nuclear warfare with the Sino-Amer ican alliance as

mentioned above, it would be extremely cautious about
resorting even to conventional attack against NATO or
Japan due to the fear of its possible escalation to
nuclear war.
Secondly, even without the fear of escalating into
the nuclear fight, the Soviet Union would not be likely
to resort to conventional attack;
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it would calculate

there would be a less chance for them to
win even a
conventional war in this tripolar system,
because of

formidable Chinese conventional power added
to the
Western Camp.
At present the Soviet Union has
5,226,600
standing forces, while the United States
has

2,158,000. 3S

in this tripolar system the United

States would gain roughly another 3,200,000
forces which

China has in the status quo.

3*

Moreover, the Soviet

troops and equipment have been criticized for
unbalanced

emphasis on quantity rather than quality:

...but Moscow’s reliance on universal conscription

of 18-year-olds means that morale and motivation
are lower than in countries with all-volunteer
forces, like the U.S. and Britain.
In conventional
units, the Kremlin has traditionally opted for
quantity over quality, relying on large numbers of

troops and weapons and deemphasizing battle field
initiative and high technology. 3 7
*

Thus even in the status quo how the Soviet's more

numerous, yet less sophisticated troops and weapons
would perform in an actual battlefield situation is a

question.

It

is

hard to estimate exactly how much and

what kind of conventional forces China would develop by
the time it acquires the second nuclear strike

capability.

Currently the quality of Chinese

conventional forces

is not

sophisticated.

However,

I

suppose it would have significantly improved quality of
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forces when it acquires the nuclear
superpower status.
Including its force on the United
States 's side would
definitely shift the conventional balance
of power in a
favorable way for the United States.
Also, China's

conventional forces would compensate for the
current

conventional military inferiority of NATO and
Japan with
respect to the Warsaw Pact 3 *, thereby enhancing
the

Sino-Amer lean alliance's extended conventional

deterrence

3.

Crisis Stability
It would be more difficult for the United States
to

achieve crisis stability in this tripolar system than in
the bipolar system.

This particular international

system would unavoidably increase the Soviet Union's
fear of the Sino-Amer ican alliance's first strike.

In

case of a crisis the Soviet Union might decide to launch
a

pre-emptive first strike, not because it thinks it

could win, but because it thinks it would receive less

damage by attacking first.
Both diplomatic measures and careful

arras

procurement policies are needed to reduce the likelihood
of Soviet pre-emption.

On the diplomatic side, neither

the United States nor China should provoke the Soviet

Union by making it think the two allies are considering
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a

first strike.

The allies should consistently advocate

and commit themselves to support a no
first-strike

posture.

Reducing Soviet fear would also be assisted
by
an agreement between the S ino-Amer ican
alliance
and the

Soviet Union that they would not put their
nuclear
forces on a high alert position.

As for the strategic

program, the United States and China should work to

reduce the vulnerability of their nuclear forces so
that
the Soviet Union would not expect that their
nuclear

capability could be destroyed by

a

Soviet first strike

in this tripolar system.

Secondly, the United States would have to accept
some trade-offs between deterrence and crisis

stability.

Since this system stabilizes deterrence and

hinders the maintenance of crisis stability, the United
States and China should consider shifting from targeting
of Soviet military bases to its economic or

sectors.

industrial

The reduced American counter-force capability

would contribute to achieving crisis stability in this
scenario, since it would convince the Soviets that there
is

less threat about the survivability of their

retaliatory forces 39
.

To make the Soviets sure this

shift matches the actual announced American policy, the

United States should encourage the exchange of

verification of each other’s silos by photoreconnaissance satellites and other methods.
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War Fighting

B.

In this scenario,

the possibility that the United

States together with China could succeed
in destroying
the Soviet Union would be higher than
in the bipolar

system. The Soviet Union would have to fight
against two
nuclear powers and at any level of the
escalation ladder

would have to be able to inflict sufficient
damage to
both nations to win.
This is surely a hard task.
it

Although the United States and China would have ultimate
advantage in war fighting, they would still consider
all-out nuclear war unacceptable.
The war-winning goal would acquire increased

relative importance in this scenario compared to the
bipolar system.
in this game

system.
have

a

is

Once war breaks out, the potential gain

considerably higher than in the bipolar

The United States together with China could

relative victory.

While pursuing this goal,

however, the United States would have to consider what
the maximum sacrifice is which it could bear.

victory would be possible, but
accompanied by costs.

it

Relative

would be still

If the United States could defeat

the Soviet Union and reduce it to a mere regional power
in Europe at

relatively low cost while the United States

remains as a dominant power,

it

would be worthwhile to

pursue this goal after the war starts.
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On the other

.

hand if the cost of victory is 100 million
dead and

destruction of majority of economic sectors,
not be worth pursuing this goal.

it would

Lastly, the

war-termination goal, at least the early termination
would lose its importance somewhat.
Escalation

control,

and damage limitation goals would have the
same,

if not

reduced, importance as in the bipolar system.

1.

War Winning
In this scenario war winning would be a more

realistic goal for the United States to pursue than in
the bipolar system.

I

assume that the United States,

even in this scenario with an increased possibility of
gain, would behave cautiously in fear of escalating

damage to its homeland at least at an early stage of
war.

If the total price the United States has to pay to

make the Soviet Union unfunctional as a nation is, for

example, 50 million casualties, it would still make its
best efforts not to intensify the war and seek for

negotiation rather than aggressively pursue a clear
relative victory.

Therefore, the United States’s likely

initial response to the Soviet limited attack would not
be an all-out response, but a limited counter-force

attack
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After the United States and the Soviet
Union
exchanged counter-force attacks, China
would roost likely
noin the combat, inflicting further
damage on the Soviet
Union.
By the time the Soviet Union exhausts
its

nuclear weapons the United States and
China would still
have their nuclear weapons left, thereby
threatening

the

Soviets with more damage.

By this time it is likely

that the Soviets would agree to negotiate with
allies,

seeing that escalation would bring no advantage to
them.

Alternatively, the Soviet Union might initiate

a

counter-value attack in hopes that it would induce the
alliance to be cautious.
If the battle should

intensify and the United

States and China had to attack Soviet non-hard targets,

they should target the remaining main industrial sectors
of the Soviet Union.

Soviet recovery.

Such damage would mean a slow

Therefore, a limited attack on these

sectors would still possibly lead the Soviet leaders to

negotiate with the

S

ino-Amer ican ally, before inflicting

massive civilian victims on each side.
There is another strategy which the alliance could

pursue for war-winning goal in this system.
S

The

ino-Amer ican alliance scenario would provide a more

promising environment for a United States-Chinese

adoption of a counter-state strategy.
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This counter-

1

.

state attack is a strategy which aims
at the Soviet

political culture. «°

The Soviet Union is a nation

whose functioning heavily depends on
its central

authority.

The rationale behind the counter-state

attack is that such a centralized state
should be quite
vulnerable to the attack on its central security
agency
and other bureaucracy that it might cause a
total

anarchy in the nation.

Colin

S.

Gray argues:

The Soviet Union, like Czarist Russia, knows that
it can absorb an enormous amount of punishment
(loss of life, industry, productive agricultural
land, and even territory), recover, and endure
until final victory
provided the essent ia
asgqnt? oj. the state remain intact. The principal
assets are the political control structure of the
highly centralized CPSU and government
41
bureaucracy.
.

.

A counter-state attack would have two major effects on

the Soviet bloc.

domestically.

First it would weaken the Soviet Union

The Soviet regime is not totally

supported by its population apart from the leading

minority European Russians. 42

The destruction of the

central political system which has been containing these

discontented minority populations could open the way to

disintegration of the Soviet society.

Second, it would

have serious effect in the Eastern Europe.

Local

nationalisms would be asserted and the bloc break up as
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Old antagonisms resurfaced.

Both the Soviet Union and

the bloc, then, would cease to exist
as effective

political forces. 43
A major

problem with this counter-state strategy
is
that it conflicts with strategies to achieve
other

war-fighting goals.

For war termination and escalation

control it would be essential that the Soviet hierarchy,
and their communication system, remain intact.

elimination of the Soviet leaders

is a

The

considerably

risky strategy, since it might escalate the Soviet
attack on the United States and China by transferring
the authority to attack from politicians to military

commanders.

Therefore, it would not be until the United

States gives up the possibility to negotiate with the

Soviet Union and decides to accept more possible damage
that it would resort to this strategy.

It requires two

parties to negotiate to terminate war or control
escalation; if the Soviet Union does not show respect to
the alliance's efforts to achieve these goal,

it would

be the time for them to consider a counter-state attack.

2.

War Termination

Even though the United States would have a stronger
incentive to win war, an all-out nuclear war would still

require a considerable price to pay.
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Therefore,

although the United States might not be as
eager to
pursue this goal as in the scenario I where

the third

actor might emerge as the net gainer in
the system, it
would still want to keep early war termination
as
an

option at least at the beginning of war to see
how much

willingness the Soviets have to negotiate.

3.

Escalation Control
Escalation control to avoid intensification would

be easier to achieve

in this tripolar system.

At each

level of intensity of the combat the United States and

China should be able to keep the favorable asymmetry of

capabilities against the Soviet Union so that they could
deter the Soviets from further aggression.
This is because, first of all, at each stage of

escalation the Soviet Union would have to cope with two
opponents, not just one.
on the Soviet Union.

This would put an extra burden

It would have to keep up with

nuclear attack by both the United States and China, and
most likely with enormous conventional attack by China.
Thus the United States and China would have an advantage
in a

quantitative sense.
Secondly, in this scenario the United States could

count on China's capability to response appropriately to
the Soviet attack,

in case the United States receives a
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fatal attack and becomes unable to
keep up with flexible
response.
In the bipolar system, for
example,

destruction of most United States land-based
ICBMs would
severely limit its capability to respond
to a Soviet

attack in a limited way;

in such a situation the United

States might be forced to retaliate in a
massive way and
escalate war quickly, employing remaining weapons
which
are less accurate and whose targets cannot be
changed
promptly.

In the tripolar system the United States

could count on China to play a fail-safe role,

compensating for the United States's disability.

Hence

the probability would increase that the United States,

with China's assistance, could seek not to escalate war.
Thirdly, China's sheer number of population and the

way it spreads in the nation is a definite advantage for

escalation control; as investigated in the first
scenario China would likely to be able to absorb more
damage of war than the United States or the Soviet
Union.

The United States, having China as its ally,

would find this tripolar system provides a favorable

environment for preventing the Soviet Union from
intensifying war.

This is because the side which has

more capacity to bear damage or which fears eruption the
least, will automatically have an advantage at each

level of escalation and thus is able to deter the

further attack by the opponent 44
.
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Hence it would be easier for the United
States

together with China to pursue escalation
control in this
tripolar system. This system would be
particularly

effective in deterring the Soviet Union from
escalating
the war from the conventional level to the
nuclear one.

Compared to the bipolar system, the United States,
with
China's contribution of its huge conventional power,
would be able to perform better in a pre-nuclear combat
with the Soviet Union.

Having a dominance at

conventional level war, the United States and China
would more likely succeed in getting the Soviet Union to

negotiate at an early stage of war.

4.

Damage Limitation

Damage limitation would have the same degree of

importance as in the bipolar system.

Since this

international system would make the United States think
that victory in war is more attainable, the United

States might have more incentives to increase its

nuclear war-fighting capability and also to increase its

defense measures to better equip itself to cope with
warfare.
it

is

In the bipolar system it is often argued that

meaningless to spend limited resources on passive

defense measures since once deterrence fails the likely
result is mutual destruction.
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In a tripolar system

marked by United States-China alliance,
the result of
war would not have to be a total
destruction of both
societies.
The United States would be more likely
to

survive the war and be able to regain its
full political
and economic strength.
In such a circumstance measures
to eliminate damage of war to a minimum
degree would

have a realistic meaning.

The improvement of currently

insufficient civil defense measures should be also

seriously considered in this scenario.

C.

Arms Control

In this tripolar system the United States and China

would enjoy a very favorable nuclear balance with

respect to the Soviet Union; probably more than enough
to deter the Soviet attack.

Therefore, it would be the

United States’s and China's interest to reduce their

arsenals somewhat to ease their military burden.

While

engaged in the arms control talks the allies should be

cautious about to what extent they could reduce their
weapons while keeping a enough deterrence capability

against the Soviet Union.
However, since the Soviet Union would unavoidably

perceive the

S

ino-Amer ican alliance's military power a

serious threat, the most important objective in the arms
control in this scenario for the United States and China
would be to enhance crisis stability.
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The United States should be careful to
seek a

coordinated attitude with China toward arms
control.
Difference and disagreements between the two

nations

should be discussed and solved prior to any
talks with
the Soviet Union.
In this scenario each nation would seek
to protect
a

particular force structure and relative level of

weaponry.

The United States would have no need to

increase its arsenals, but could rather reduce them.

it

would maintain its current balanced force structure

among ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. The Soviet Union would
try to increase its arsenals as much as possible without

triggering a major

S

ino-Amer ican reaction.

It would

want a larger number of medium-range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles

(IRBMs) to cope with the Chinese counterparts which

would be installed along the border.

To strengthen its

second strike capability, it would also deploy more
bombers.

China's nuclear arsenals would probably

consist of numerous MRBMs and IRBMs and a few long-range
missiles to reach Moscow and Leningrad.

Unlike in the

first scenario China does not have to worry about

deterring the United States so
long-range missiles.

It would,

it

would not need as many

however, maintain the

balanced structure of land-based and submarine-based

missiles
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1.

Deterrence

Since this particular tripolar system
would further
deter the Soviet attack, the biggest
priority in arms
control would likely be enhancement of
crisis

stability.

Hence, measures to stabilize deterrence

would be subordinated when there exists
a conflict

between achievement of deterrence and of crisis
stability.

However, measures which would enhance

deterrence and crisis stability at the same time,
such
as making vulnerable ICBMs more mobile and
small, should
be pursued at the negotiation table.

2.

Crisis Stability
In this tripolar system the United States might

actually find

it has to

sacrifice arms control for the

sake of crisis stability.

To enhance crisis stability

the United States needs weapons which are less

vulnerable, inaccurate, slow 43 , and targeted at Soviet

cities rather than forces.
Less vulnerable weapons would convince the Soviets
that they could not destroy the United States nuclear

forces by their first strike, and they would also

enhance deterrence.

Inaccurate and slow weapons would

not be able to succeed in destroying the Soviet

retaliatory forces seriously; inaccurate weapons would
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unlikely strike all the targeted Soviet
forces and slow
weapons would give the Soviets enough
warning
time to

counter-act the attack.

Hence weapons with these

characteristics would reduce the Soviet fear of
an
alliance's attack depriving the Soviet Union

of the

retaliatory capability.
Unfortunately, however, these missiles would be
incompatible with deterrence enhancement.

Slow and

inaccurate missiles would unavoidably decrease the

credibility of United States successful second strike
capability.

The same thing can be said about the

altering the targets.

Changing targets from the Soviet

military forces to, for instance, economic or industrial
sectors, would reduce an American retaliatory threat.

Considering the fact that this tripolar system
encourages deterrence and discourages crisis stability,
I

think the United States should accept some trade-offs

at the negotiation table which might eliminate

deterrence effect to some extent, by employing weapons
with above characters and by switching the targets.
It is also important to deploy many small missiles

on the ground rather than a few large ones; numerous

small missiles would be unattractive targets for the

Soviet Union, therefore, discourage the Soviet first
strike in a crisis.

To deploy many small missiles which
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have these characteristics, rather
than a £ev big ones
would serve the United States -s
objective to achieve

crisis stability.

However, those missiles are difficult

to verify, therefore making arms
control more difficult.

The United States should not seek to
deploy

missiles such as the MX, which have great
accuracy,
since their dangers outweigh their merit in
this

tripolar system.

These missiles would make the Soviets

believe that the United States regards a first
strike as

militarily advantageous to itself, and therefore, would
push the Soviet toward a pre-emptive strike in a crisis.
On the other hand deployment of cruise missiles

would be compatible with increasing crisis stability,

because they take relatively long time to reach their
targets.

The problem with these missiles is that they

are difficult to verify.

moreover,

it

is

They are relatively small and

hard to tell if they are nuclear-armed

or conventionally armed.

Considering the significance of ensuring crisis
stability,

I

assume that it is more beneficial for the

United States to deploy these weapons even

if

it

cannot

come up with a formal arms treaty with the Soviet Union
due to the verification difficulties associated with

these weapons.
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CHAPTER IV

SCENARIO III: SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE

In this section

I

will investigate the implication

tripolarity when the Soviet Union and China
form an
alliance; a threatening scenario for the United
of

States.

assume a formal security alliance between
the Soviet
Union and China by a written treaty in which
China is a
I

steady ally of the Soviet Union.

The United States has

to face opponents having together
nuclear arsenals twice

as large as its own.

A.

Deterrence

This scenario is roughly a mirror image of the
last.

The alliance could deter a United States attack

easily, but the United States would find it difficult to

deter an alliance attack.

Yet the United States could

still deter if it were able to maintain a credible

second strike capability against the combined forces of
the alliance.

1.

Basic Deterrence
In this version of the tripolar system, the

credibility of United States will to retaliate against
the Soviet attack would be more questionable than in the
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bipolar system.

However, that would not be enough
for

the Soviet Union and China to
attack the United States.
Even in this scenario where the
Soviet Union and
China would have a definite
quantitative

military

advantage over the United States,
they would still be
hesitant to attack the United States
first.
First of
all,

just like the United State and/or
China could not

deprive the Soviet Union of its second
strike capability
in the second scenario,

even in a successful Soviet

and/or Chinese first attack, the United
States would be
most likely to maintain enough nuclear
capability to
inflict unacceptable damage to both nations in
this

scenario
An unacceptable damage for the Soviet Union is

estimated to be 20 to 25 percent of population loss and
50 to 65 percent of

industry destruction, which would

require the nuclear destructive power of 400 megaton

equivalent, or probably less, considering the higher

concentration of population and industry in the Soviet
society.'4 *

As

I

examined in the second scenario, an

unacceptable damage for China would probably be more
than 25 percent of population loss and around 50 percent
of

industrial damage.

This would require 600 to 800

megaton equivalent weapons.

In total, therefore,

1,000

to 1,200 megaton equivalent destructive power would be
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necessary for the United States to
inflict unacceptable
damage to both the Soviet Union and
China.

At present the average yield
of United States's

nuclear warheads is 0.4 equivalent
megatonnage

.

if

the United States continues to
sustain this level of

destructive power per warhead, it would
need 2,500 to
3,000 warheads to yield 1,000 to 1,200
equivalent
megatonnage.

As for launchers, one United States

launcher carries seven warheads in average
in the status
quo (two for ICBMs, ten for SLBMs, and 15.5
for

bombers ).«•

Hence the United States would need to

possess 360 to 430 launchers to carry 2,500 to
3,000

warheads in order to yield 1,000 to 1,200 equivalent

megatonnage
Even in a successful first strike by the alliance,
the United States appears able to maintain enough

nuclear capability to inflict unacceptable damage to
each adversary.

The United States Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency assumes that

a

successful Soviet

first attack on the United States would mean destruction
of 70 percent of ICBMs,

percent of bombers.

4®

40-50 percent of SLBMs, and 70

Even if the attack is joined by

China, this figure would not change very much; it is

impossible for the alliance to destroy all the United
States

's

forces, since certain numbers of submarines are
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at sea and a certain portion of
the bombers in the air
at all times.
Finally as long as nuclear weapons
do not

achieve 100 percent accuracy, it is
impossible to
destroy all of the even easily targeted

forces such as

land-based ICBMs, submarines in ports, or
nonalert
bombers

Currently the United States has approximately
5,000
megaton equivalent nuclear weapons in about
13,800

warheads and 1,960 launchers. 30
scenario,

I

in this tripolar

would suppose that the United States would

increase its military budget and deploy more nuclear
weapons; at present the United States enjoys a GNP which
is

approximately twice that of the Soviet Union and

eight times that of China.

Even with the Soviet Union

and China combined, the United States still possesses
1.65 times more GNP. 31

Yet its ratio of GNP allocated

to the military spending is only one third of that of

the Soviet Union. 32

It

is hard to

imagine the United

States would maintain this modest military spending

against a Sino-Soviet alliance.

However, even if the

United States would only maintained 5,000 megaton

equivalent arsenals,

it

would still be able to maintain

the second strike capability to bring unacceptable

damages to both the Soviet Union and China.

In case of

the successful first strike by the Soviet Union and/or
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China, the remaining 30 percent of
ICBMs (300 launchers
and 678 warheads), 50 percent of SLBMs
(320 launchers
and 3,330 warheads), and 30 percent of
bombers (95

bombers and 1490 warheads) would yield about
2,200

megaton equivalent power, 03 which exceeds the
1,200

megaton equivalent required to impose unacceptable
damage on the alliance.

Therefore, in terms of

capability, the United States would be credible enough
to deter the alliance's attack.

More problematic would be the credibility of United

States will to retaliate.

Suppose the United States

receives a nuclear attack from the alliance after some

conflict takes place.

In this tripolar scenario, there

would be no chance for the United States to emerge as a
winner, enjoying a relative victory after nuclear war,
and it would have a stronger interest not to escalate
the war than in the bipolar system.

With this apparently decreased desire to escalate
war, the United States's will to retaliate would appear

less credible to the Soviet Union and China.

The United

States might actually choose to negotiate rather than

retaliate and escalate war, inviting

a

second round of

nuclear bombardment from the alliance.

However, it is

hard to say which option the United States would choose

against the alliance's first strike.
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If the United

States decides that the alliance also
desires to avoid
unacceptable damage, it would resort to a
limited

retaliation to show its will to fight in hopes
that the
allies would agree to negotiate rather
than intensify
the war.
To sum up, a tripolar system marked by
a

Sino-Soviet alliance would provide less favorable

environment for the United States to achieve basic

deterrence than the bipolar system.

However, the

situation is not entirely hopeless.

First, the United

States would retain at least 2,200 megaton equivalent

weapons after the successful alliance's first strike
which would be able to inflict unacceptable damage to
both nations.

This capability would be a threat to the

Soviet Union and China, and would force them to behave

cautiously.

They cannot make the United States

defenseless by their first strike to the degree that

it

cannot bring the second strike capability to them.
Second, although the United States's credibility of will
to retaliate would decrease, the alliance could never be

certain that the United States would not retaliate.
This uncertainty of will combined with the clear second

strike capability would pose the Soviet Union and
China.

Therefore,

I

assume that even in this scenario

the Soviet Union and China would choose to coexist with
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the United States rather than take
major risks by

launching a nuclear first strike.

2.

Extended Deterrence
Extended deterrence against either

a

nuclear or

conventional attack by the alliance would also
diminish
in a tripolar system featuring a Sino-Soviet
alliance.
If

the Soviet Union succeeds in destroying a
United

States ally,

it would be a direct gain for the

Sino-Soviet camp, weakening the United States power.
the following

I

In

will examine the cases of deterring

nuclear and conventional attack separately.
For extended deterrence against the alliance's

nuclear attack, credibility of United States will to

retaliate matters most.

The Soviet Union and China

would likely think that the United States would be more

reluctant to retaliate after Europe or Japan

is

attacked, exposing its own homeland to counter-

retaliation from both nations, and escalating war.

The

United States would be more fearful of escalating war in
this scenario than in the bipolar system, because it has
no chance of being a relative victor at any level of war

escalation
After a nuclear attack on Western Europe or Japan
the United States has to consider that retaliation
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against the Soviet Union or China would
be followed by
counter-retaliation from the alliance, most
likely

concentrated on cities and industrial areas.

a

Such an

escalation of war would surely bring further
damage to
the United States, and worst of all, even
if the United
States bears the damage, it could not expect
ultimate
victory.

Therefore, as long as the damage

is

limited to

the European continent or to Japan, the United
States

would be more inclined to negotiate with the Sino-Soviet

alliance from even an inferior position, rather than
retaliate.

This decreased credibility of the American

will to retaliate would likely tempt the alliance to

attack American allies.
An even more disturbing result of this

international system for the United States would be the

erosion of extended deterrence against the Sino-Soviet

alliance's conventional attack.

Here, the problem would

be the United States's and its ally's capability rather

than will.

At present the Warsaw Pact enjoys a wide

margin of relative advantage in conventional forces over
NATO.

For instance, the Warsaw Pact has twice as many

divisions as NATO, and it possesses 68,300 main battle
tanks which are also twice as many as NATO does.

Japan's military forces are much more limited than

NATO's.® 4

Combined together, the Soviet Union and
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China would create the most formidable
conventional
military power in the world. Adding
China's huge

conventional power to the Soviet side of the
present
unfavorable balance of conventional forces

would be a

significant threat to the security of American
allies.
Even today the United States's and its ally's

conventional military forces are criticized as
inadequate to deter the Soviet conventional attack
with
high credibility.

Albert Carnesale, Joseph

S.

Nye, Jr.,

and Graham T. Allison argue:

By choosing to rely on early nuclear use, the
United States and its European and Japanese allies
have opted for defense "on the cheap." Current
political preferences make an early reversal of
this policy unlikely, but it is not unaffordable.
The Soviet Union enjoys no economic advantage over
the United States.
Quite the reverse: the U.S.
gross national product GNP
is roughly twice that
of the Soviet Union.
Moreover, the United States
and its allies enjoy a combined GNP more than four
times that of the Soviet Union and its allies. ss
(

)

Improving the United States's and its ally's

conventional forces would be the top priority for
enhancing extended deterrence in this tripolar system.
This is even more important than in the bipolar system,

since this system provides greater temptation for

a

Sino-Soviet conventional attack against the American
allies.

The alliance could achieve the victory in
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Europe or In Japan more easily than
the Soviets could In
the bipolar system.

3.

Crisis Stability
In this particular scenario,

the United States does

not have to worry about the alliance's fear
of an

American first strike since such an act would be
highly
irrational.

Rather, the alliance would have to consider

whether the United States might be driven to launch

pre-emptive strike against the alliance.
be the allies'

a

Hence it would

responsibility to reduce United States

fear of their first strike as long as it wants to

maintain deterrence.
Although the United States would not carry the main
burden of enhancing crisis stability in this tripolar
system,

it

stability.

could still contribute to enhancing
The United States could,

for example, make

efforts to extend its warning systems to avoid accident
due to false alarms.

It could also avoid putting

its

forces in high-alert position or upgrade its safety

devices so that the first strike would not be triggered
easily.

Albert Carnesale, Joseph

S.

Nye, Jr., and

Graham T. Allison state:

Of particular concern is the absence of PALs
(permissive action links) on the nuclear warheads
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on submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, enabling
launch of these weapons even in the
absence of an
express order from the president or his
authorized

successor 56

Such improvements would aid the United
States to enhance
crisis stability and make nuclear war less
likely.

B.

War Fighting

In this scenario the Sino-Soviet alliance
has a

clear advantage in war fighting over the United
States.
How the United States should make a war-fighting

strategy depends on how the Soviet Union and China
interpret the likely outcome of war.
As stated in the section of deterrence, the United

States would probably be able to carry out second

strikes inflicting unacceptable damage on both the
Soviet Union and China.

The Soviets would most likely

suffer at least 50 to 60 million dead and loss of 50 to
65 percent of their

industry.* 7

If,

however, the

United States concentrates most of its forces on Soviet
targets, the Soviet Union could suffer loss of 100

million population loss and 70 percent of its industrial
base

.

This United States nuclear capability would

encourage the Soviets to adopt a limited war strategy.
It would engage

in war in a cautious manner,
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trying to

prevent war from escalating further
at every level of
combat , and trying to negotiate with
the United States
before it suffers unacceptable damage.
After
all

nuclear war is too costly even in
this scenario where
the Sino-Soviet alliance has a clear
advantage

in war

fighting.

Thus, the United States should prepare
its

war-fighting policy based on this assumption
that the
alliance would wish to avoid an all-out nuclear

war in

this tripolar system.

1.

War Winning
In this tripolar system this policy goal would
be

unattainable.
a

In the bipolar system there might be such

thing as a relative victory after the all-out war.

In

this tripolar system, however, there is definitely not a

chance for the United States to emerge as victor.

It is

totally impossible for the United States to shatter both
the Soviet Union and China without being shattered

itself.

Thus it is not sane for the United States to

try to seek victory in this power distribution.

The

United States should elaborate strategy to achieve other

war-fighting goals.

2.

War Termination

This would become an important goal for the United
States.

The task for the United States in this power
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system would be to terminate war as
soon as possible
with an acceptable negotiation; war
termination would be
meaningless , if the negotiation imposes
the United
States's disintegration, for instance.
As long as the

alliance dreads going to all-out war and

it sees

that

the United States is ready to engage in
such a warfare
if

the content of negotiation offer is unacceptable,

there should be some opportunity to terminate war
with
both sides' concession after some level of intensity
ladder
To leave the opportunity to cease fighting at some

point of warfare through clear negotiation, first of
all,

it

is

important for the United States to protect

its communication links with the Soviet Union and

China.

The currently vulnerable "hot line" between the

United States and the Soviet Union would have to be

greatly improved in this tripolar system, and reliable

communication links with China would have to be
established.

Otherwise there would be no chance for the

leaders of three nations to stay in sufficient contact
to negotiate an end to the war.

United States

's

It would also be in the

interest for the Soviet Union and China

to have a reliable communication line between

themselves.

Otherwise

it

would be difficult for the
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alliance to reach an agreement about
when and under what
stipulations to cease fire.
Next, current American plans for
early attack on
the Soviet C 3 I systems*- should be
altered.
In the
same way the United States should not
attack the Chinese
C 3 I systems, either.
As stated in the first scenario,

although communication disruption might limit
the damage
on the United States the damages it poses
seem greater.
Even if political leaders succeed in negotiating
to

terminate war, communication disruption might make
it
impossible for them to circulate cease-fire orders
to
the various military units.

Since the United States

would have a greater interest in terminating war in
this

tripolar system than in the bipolar system, it should
not attack its opponents' C 3 I systems.

It should also

avoid strategies based on attacking either ally's

leadership as most American strategists agree

in the

bipolar system.**
At the same time the United States should make

greater efforts to improve its own communication and
information systems, which are now highly vulnerable to
even a limited nuclear attack.

Since the Soviet Union

and China would have no more interest in negotiating

with the United States in this scenario than in the
bipolar system, the American C 3 I system would be a
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target.

Hence the United States should take
the same

measures to strengthen its C 3 I systems
and protect
political leaders in this scenario as it
would in the
bipolar system.

3.

Escalation Control
It would be almost impossible for the
United States

to keep the Sino-Soviet alliance from escalating
war,

because at every level the alliance would be able to

maintain a favorable asymmetry of capabilities.
scenario the United States would have to fight

In this
a

two-front war, inflicting an appropriate level of damage
to both nations at an appropriate time.

This burden

would ensure less satisfactory performance of the United
States in escalation control strategy than in any other

scenarios

Although the Sino-Soviet alliance would have the
ultimate advantage in war-fighting, they would not want
war to escalate to the extent they suffer "unacceptable

damage."

They would accept great damage

existence of their nations were at stake.

if the

However, they

would not likely be willing to bear as much suffering
for anything less.

Even reducing the United States to a

second rank power would not be sufficient compensation
for suffering the unacceptable damage defined earlier.
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Therefore, the alliance would likely try
to prevent war
from intensifying at each escalation
level, and try to
seek negotiation with the United States
in this

scenario. The best the United States could
do in this
situation would be to fight enough at any given
level of
escalation so that it could induce as favorable
peace
terms as possible from the alliance.

4.

Damage Limitation
The United States would have to make greater

efforts to limit damage in this tripolar system.

The

damage which would be imposed by the opponents would be
more severe in this scenario, since the United States

would be fighting against two nuclear powers, not only
one as in the bipolar system.

The United States should

seek to develop its currently insufficient civil defense

programs, such as the urban evacuation plan, for damage

limitation as discussed in other two scenarios.

C.

Arms Control

In this scenario the United States should seek to

narrow the nuclear gap between the alliance and itself.
It should also urge its European allies and Japan to

build up their arsenals.

Unlike the Soviet Union or

Warsaw Pact, the United States, European allies, and
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Japan should be able to afford to build
up thetr nuclear
arsenals to cope with this threatening
scenario.
Even

if

the United States could not achieve
a near

parity with Sino-Soviet alliance, it should
vigorously
seek to maintain a credible second strike
capability so
that deterrence would not fail.
To enhance deterrence

would be the most important objective for the
United

States in this scenario.

At the same time the United

States should try to convince the Sino-Soviet
alliance
that it should reduce some of its arsenal to enhance the

crisis stability for their own sake.
In this scenario the three nations would also have

distinctive preferences.

The United States would want

to increase its overall nuclear arsenal.

It would

particularly try to increase the number of SLBMs and
mobile ICBMs to strengthen its second strike

capability.

The Soviet Union would maintain its current

arsenal or might even reduce it, since it would not have
to worry about Chinese

intentions.

Unlike in the other

scenarios or in bipolar system, it could abandon those
IRBMs and MRBMs directed at Chinese targets.

Its

balance between among ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers would
likely remain the same.

The Chinese arsenal would

mostly consist of long-range missiles to reach the
United States and Europe.

This is because it would not
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have to worry about deterring a
Soviet attack as in the
first or second scenario.
Its possession of ice-free
harbors along the Pacific allows it to
have a balanced
force structure between ICBMs and SLBMs
like the United
States.
Its current reluctance to develop
bombers means
that China would split its forces among
ICBMs and SLBMs
only.
It appears unlikely to develop a "triad"
like the

Soviets or American possess.

1.

Deterrence
To have enough double second strike capability

against both the Soviet Union and China the United
States would have to sustain at least around 1,200

megaton equivalent power.

In the arms control

in this

scenario it would be the United States's vital interest
to maintain weapons which could yield this much

destructive power to keep deterrence.
The United States should demand that the alliance

reduce the number of Soviet and Chinese missiles with
high accuracy.

Such Soviet missiles at present could

destroy 85-90 percent of American land-based missiles in
theory.* 0

In this scenario China would most likely

possess missiles with same degree of accuracy.

Although

land-based missiles are not the only weapons the United
States would retain, enhancing deterrence in this
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tripolar system requires that even the
threat against
this leg of American triad be reduced.
Reduction of
those accurate weapons would also
enhance crisis
stability, mitigating the fear of the
United States that
the alliance counter-force attack would
deprive it of

nuclear capability.

Hence it would be possible that the

alliance compromises and forgo some of their
accurate
missiles as long as they are interested in crisis
stability.
The United States would have to face the alliance
at the negotiation from a weak position in terms
of its

arsenal's quantitative features.

To extract favorable

concessions from the alliance to strengthen deterrence
such as the reduction of their number of weapons, it

would be very important for the United States to

maintain its current edge in weapons technology. So long
as the United States has qualitative advantages which

the alliance regards as important and unduplicable in a

near future,

it could use them as bargaining chips

in

return for alliance force reductions or rearrangements.

2.

Crisis Stability
The United States ability to strengthen crisis

stability through arms control would be limited
scenario.

in this

It would be mainly the alliance's burden to
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convince the United states that they
are not seeking to
deprive it of its second strike capability.
As has been seen, even in this
scenario the Soviet

Union and China would likely regard
nuclear war as
costly and would prefer to peacefully
coexist with the
United States.
Hence they would probably
have a

considerable interest in enhancing crisis stability
through negotiations.

The United States would also wish

to ensure that the alliance does not have an
incentive
to attack first in a crisis.

These parallel interests

should lead the alliance and the United States to

mutually satisfactory agreements in strengthening crisis
stability.

As noted in the preceding discussion of

deterrence,

it would be possible

for the United States

to persuade the alliance to reduce the number of their

accurate missiles for crisis stability, or to replace
some of their missiles with short flight tiroes with slow

missiles.

These measures would not only enhance crisis

stability but also enhance the United States
deterrence.

Other measures both the United States and

the alliance could easily agree on would be keeping

submarines in enough distance from the opponent's
coasts, or avoiding keeping bombers in high alert

position so that they could raise the nuclear threshold.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

After examining the implication of
China's
attaining superpower status in each
scenario, it

is

clear that the question of whether a
tripolar nuclear
system would be more stable than the current
bipolar

nuclear system depends largely on the nature
of

alignments among the three great powers.
A tripolar system in which two of the
superpowers

are aligned against the third is more unstable
than the

bipolar system.

The two-power side immediately topples

the balance of power in the system,

relative to the third superpower.

increasing its power
This gives the

alliance more incentives to attack the relatively weaker
side.

At the same time the system increases the

possibility that the underdog pre-empts out of the fear
that the opponents are undertaking to attack it.
On the other hand, presence of a nonaligned third

nuclear superpower creates a system more stable than the

bipolar system.

This is because the two original

superpowers develop a common interest despite the basic
antagonism.

They want to avoid a major fight between

themselves so that the third superpower would not be an

automatic gainer

in the

system over the two crippled
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superpowers after the fight.

Thus the two original

superpowers would act in a more
cautious way, taking
into account the presence of the
third superpower.
Mandelbaum states in his Ttis. Nuclear
Revolution

.

The emergence of another major
nuclear power could
he senousiy unsettling.
...Of all the possible
multipolar systems, moreover, one involving
three
major powers might well be the most
perilous,
because the change of allegiance of any one
of the
principals would always be decisive, as is not
the
case in a multipolar system.
It is clear that Mandelbaum presupposes
in the

above argument that the third major power

unstable ally or at least it is not
power in the system.

He

is

a

is a

fairly

solid independent

absolutely correct to argue

that the tripolar system is unstable as long as the

third superpower frequently shifts its allegiance or
joins another superpower as a permanent ally.

argument

is not,

however,

This

inclusive, since it disregards

the possibility of the third nuclear superpower being a

stable nonaligned nation.

Nuclear proliferation has been criticized as

destabilizing the international system.

It

would be

dangerous if a dozen of small- or medium-size nations
become nuclear powers, especially if they were

politically unstable, lacked second strike capability or
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had unsophisticated control systems.
of a stable ,

Though emergence

nonaligned third nuclear power having

second strike capability will have an
advantageous

effect for international peace, the same
condition

is

less likely to be attained in a world of
four or more

such superpowers.

The temptation to form and re-form

alliance would be far greater.
Besides, a multipolar nuclear system

attainable in the foreseeable future.

is not

There are few

states in the current international system that could
become full nuclear superpowers.

To do so, a state has

to possess necessary resources and technology to produce

second strike nuclear capability, and sophisticated

command and control systems to ensure against accident.
More importantly, the nation has to possess large

territory and population so that

it could not be

shattered by a single first nuclear strike.

This

requirement eliminates many of the nations which meet
the first requirement, such as most of the nations in

Europe.

China is one of the few nations which would

likely satisfy all the necessary conditions in the
future.

The most promising candidates after China are

India and Brazil.

Yet they appear to be further from

attainment of superpower status than China.
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For now, therefore,

if

any change takes place in

the current bipolar system at all,

it would be a

transformation to a tripolar system with
China as the
third nuclear superpower.
Considering

this probability,

it

is

not a bad thing for the United States
or for the

Soviet Union that China would likely stay
as a

nonaligned power in the future.

Chinese nonalignment

would create the most stable system among
other tripolar

scenarios investigated in this thesis and

a more stable

system than the current bipolar one as well.
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